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RETURNING RIGHT-TO-FARM LAWS TO THEIR 
ROOTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, some unlikely culprits—four chickens—generated negative 
headlines for then-Iowa Congressman Bruce Braley, who was in the midst 
of a close campaign for an open United States Senate seat.1 After neighbor 
Pauline Hampton’s chickens roamed onto the Braleys’ property, the Braleys 
filed a formal complaint with the neighborhood homeowners association 
and allegedly threatened to sue.2 If the Braleys had done so, questions of the 
scale of Hampton’s operation, how long she had had the chickens, and 
whether the Braleys or the chickens were in the neighborhood first would 
have been key considerations. Similar disputes between neighbors over 
agricultural land uses play out across America. This Note will focus on one 
attempt to manage these disputes: right-to-farm (RTF) laws. 
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I continues to introduce the tension 
between urban and rural land uses, the importance of understanding it, and 
the mechanism of RTF laws that legislatures have adopted to mitigate it. 
Part I goes on to explain how different states design their RTF laws and 
considers previous scholarly treatment of RTF laws. This Note is indebted 
to the pre-existing literature on RTF laws, and recognizes and aims to 
contribute to some of these existing critiques and proposals: First, in Part II, 
this Note aims to add concreteness to the literature’s critique of RTF laws 
by focusing on two particular ways in which RTF laws have improperly 
expanded immunity from nuisance liability and by delving into illustrative 
case law demonstrating how these expansions operate in practice.3 In doing 
so, this Note will show how certain veins of RTF laws have become 
particularly unmoored from RTF laws’ origins as codifications of the 
coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine.4  
In Part III, this Note then offers a concrete policy for returning RTF laws 
to their roots, ensuring agricultural operations are better held accountable 
for their effects on their communities. The Note cites a particular vein of 
RTF laws, namely Washington’s, focusing on desirable provisions, as an 
 
1. Adam P. Levy, Iowa Chickens vs. Senate Candidate’s Yard, CNN (Sept. 17, 2014, 10:39 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/17/politics/iowa-senate-braley-chicken-dispute/index.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/GWY5-7CSL]. 
2. Philip Rucker, In Iowa, a Dispute over Neighbor’s Chickens Threatens Braley’s Senate Bid, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-iowa-a-dispute-over-neighbo 
rs-chickens-threatens-braleys-senate-bid/2014/08/07/4ae3d5e2-1e47-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.ht 
ml?utm_term=.0dbf619ba7a0 [https://perma.cc/ZZH9-U364].  
3. See discussion infra Section II. 
4. See discussion infra Section II. 











existing model for all states to consider adopting.5 It recommends revising 
RTF laws with even greater textual specificity than Washington’s so they 
only protect established agricultural operations facing urbanizing 
pressures.6 It also proposes revising RTF laws so that an operation that 
substantially changes its nature loses its immunity. In addition to legislative 
reform, this Note’s proposal also encourages jurists to consider the 
legislative intent and history behind RTF laws to better partner with 
legislatures in achieving their goals, echoing and defending Professor 
Andrew Reinert’s argument on judicial interpretation.7  
This Note will then argue in Part IV that this model best accommodates 
the literature’s critique of RTF laws. While sharing some of these critiques, 
this Note approaches the literature with the perspective that reform of RTF 
laws is more likely than abolition. Therefore, it aims to answer but also 
temper some of the critiques by fleshing out two primary justifications 
supporting this reform: it restores the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine’s 
importance in RTF laws—thus honoring parties’ expectations and property-
for-personhood interests—and it reduces the economic inefficiency 
generated by RTF laws. In doing so, it draws on arguments from property 
theory, sociology, and economics to demonstrate why this Note’s proposal 
strikes a healthy balance between the competing policy concerns RTF laws 
involve.8 Part V considers public policy implications of implementing this 
reform. The Note then concludes. 
I. ORIGIN OF RTF LAWS 
A. American Agriculture in the 21st Century 
Agriculture has been and is a mainstay of the American economy. At the 
heart of the American agricultural industry are America’s farms. Millions 
of Americans work on farms, and agriculture- and food-related industries 
support millions more jobs.9 The output of America’s farms accounts for 
$132 billion of America’s gross national product, and enables other sectors 
of the American economy including food service, textiles, apparel, and 
 
5. See discussion infra Section III. In contrast, some research has only focused on one state’s 
RTF Law. E.g., Thomas B. McNulty, Comment, The Pennsylvanian Farmer Receives No Real 
Protection from the Pennsylvania Right to Farm Act, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 81 (2001); L. Paul 
Goeringer & H.L. Goodwin, An Overview of Arkansas’ Right-to-Farm Law, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1 
(2013). 
6. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
7. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
8. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
9. Ag and Food Sectors of the Economy, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sect 












leather manufacturing.10 Less directly but no less importantly, farms support 
jobs in machinery manufacturing and construction, and farmers and 
ranchers invest in their own communities.11 The political controversy over 
the effects of recent tariffs targeting America’s agriculture industry speaks 
again to the continued economic importance of the industry, especially to 
America’s rural communities.12 The agriculture industry also influences 
how America’s land is used and conserved as over half of America’s land 
is devoted to agricultural production.13  
B. Burgeoning Urban-Rural Tension 
Despite the continued importance of America’s farms and ranches to 
shaping our economy and geography, urbanization has often forced them 
into retreat—and litigation. In the mid-twentieth century, 63 percent of 
American land was used for agricultural purposes.14 In 2012, it had lowered 
to 52 percent.15 In contrast, “[u]rban land . . . has nearly tripled in area since 
1949.”16 Urbanization puts farms under pressure. New residents, unused to 
living near farms, may find rural life less than idyllic; nuisance suits against 
agricultural operations are certainly nothing new.17  
A landmark case exposing the tension between urbanization and 
established rural uses comes from Maricopa County, Arizona: Spur 
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.18 Farmers had established 
themselves in the area in the early twentieth century, and the surrounding 
 
10. Id. 
11. JOINT ECON. COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF AMERICA’S 
FARMERS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (2013), https://www.jec.senate.gov/publ 
ic/_cache/files/266a0bf3-5142-4545-b806-ef9fd78b9c2f/jec-agriculture-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X 
RD8-ETG5]. 
12. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Patricia Cohen, Trade War Prospect Shakes Part of Trump Base: 
Midwest Farmers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/business/econom 
y/tariffs-farmers.html [https://perma.cc/Y4FT-AQ8J]; Jeff Daniels, ‘We Are the Casualty:’ US Pig 
Farmers Brace for Second Round of Pork Tariffs from China, Mexico, CNBC (July 4, 2018, 12:24 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/04/us-pork-producers-brace-for-new-pork-tariffs-from-china-mexico.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/P3NV-J7RZ]. 
13. Land and Natural Resources, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., https://w 
ww.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/land-and-natural-resource 
s/ [https://perma.cc/3KCR-48B9] (last updated Aug. 20, 2019).  
14. Id.  
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Jonathan Morris, Comment, “One Ought Not Have So Delicate a Nose”: CAFOs, 
Agricultural Nuisance, and the Rise of the Right to Farm, 47 ENVTL. L. 261, 264 (2017). Morris traces 
nuisance law both in early English common law and American law, and reports that as early as 1610, 
one neighbor sued another for constructing and operating a pigsty. Id. at 263–64; see also William 
Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (KB). 
18. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc).  











communities were initially agriculturally oriented.19 Cattle feeding was a 
particularly popular operation.20 But the agricultural orientation of 
Maricopa County did not last. In the 1950s and 60s, real estate developer 
Del Webb began buying thousands of acres in Maricopa County, including 
ranch land, to construct the Sun City retirement community.21 But 
development hit a snag: Spur Industries, a feedlot operator with over twenty 
thousand cattle.22 The odors and flies generated by the feedlot drifted into 
Sun City, prompting complaints from new owners and hesitation from 
potential purchasers.23 Webb sued, alleging that Spur was a public nuisance 
that rendered over a thousand of his lots “unfit” for development.24 
Although Spur maintained a lawful feedlot operation,25 the Arizona 
Supreme Court found that Spur was “both a public and a private nuisance” 
and affirmed the trial court’s order enjoining its operations.26 Even though 
the court ordered Spur to move its operations, it recognized that Spur was 
not at fault.27 Webb knew of the area’s agricultural character when he started 
building, and the court found that “[i]n such an area plaintiffs cannot 
complain that legitimate agricultural pursuits are being carried on in the 
vicinity.”28 Recognizing both the public’s need for relief and Webb’s role 
in creating the problem, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Webb to 
indemnify Spur for its costs of moving or shutting down.29 This judicial 
balancing is one approach to resolving what occurs when one comes to a 
nuisance30 but other approaches soon sprang up. 
C. Right-to-Farm Laws: A Solution? 
States and municipalities have attempted to mitigate the tensions 
between urbanization and existing rural land uses, such as those in Spur, 
 
19. Id. at 703. 
20. Id. at 704. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 705. 
23. Id.  
24. Id.  
25. Id. The court admitted that Spur had “good feedlot management and good housekeeping 
practices.” Id.  
26. Id. at 706. 
27. Id. at 708 (“Spur is required to move not because of any wrongdoing on the part of 
Spur . . . .”). 
28. Id. at 707. 
29. Id. at 708. 
30. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 860–61 (12th ed. 2010) (introducing the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine); see also 
Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on 
Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 105–06 (discussing judicial balancing in 












with a variety of land use policies, such as agricultural districting31 and 
agricultural zoning.32 However, due to weaknesses with each approach,33 
states sought a new approach: RTF laws.34 North Carolina and Washington 
were the first states to pass versions of RTF laws on March 26, 1979.35 Now, 
all fifty states have adopted RTF laws36 and a couple states have even 
amended their constitutions to enshrine farming as a constitutional right.37 
In reference to RTF statutes, one commentator has determined that “[a]long 
with property tax breaks, they are by far the most ubiquitous farmland 
protection program in this country.”38  
Some commentators consider North Carolina’s RTF law39 a model 
statute.40 It provides sweeping protection to agricultural land users, 
protecting “any facility for the production for commercial purposes of 
crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.”41 Further, 
an agricultural or forestry operation which has been established for longer 
than a year and was not a nuisance when it began operating may not become 
a nuisance no matter how nearby land uses change.42 It keeps this immunity 
unless the operation undergoes a “fundamental change.”43 Yet proving that 
a fundamental change has occurred is difficult because the statute provides 
 
31. Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of 
Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 294–95 (1984) (agricultural districting designates “a specific area 
for a long-term agricultural use”). 
32. Id. at 295–96 (agricultural zoning occurs in both exclusive and non-exclusive forms and is 
characterized by zoning lots ranging from 10 to 160 acres).  
33. Id. at 297. For example, it takes time and effort to create the political will to engage in 
agricultural districting or zoning all while rural and urban land uses continue clashing. Id.  
34. See States’ Right-to-Farm Statutes, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/st 
ate-compilations/right-to-farm/, for a database containing copies of all state RTF laws. This Note here 
retreads some well-covered ground in the literature to introduce unfamiliar readers but does not aim to 
provide a comprehensive survey of the fifty varying statutes. 
35. Hand, supra note 31, at 298 n.47. 
36. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 77 (Looseleaf 9th ed. 2016).  
37. Missouri, for example, amended its constitution to add a right to farm:  
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is the foundation 
and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, 
the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be forever 
guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred by article VI of the 
Constitution of Missouri.  
MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; see also N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29. 
38. Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1694, 1695 (1998). 
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-700 to -701 (West 2019). 
40. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1707 (“North Carolina’s Right-to-Farm Statute is considered a 
model statute.”); Nicholas Clark Buttino, An Empirical Analysis of Agricultural Preservation Statutes 
in New York, Nebraska, and Minnesota, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 99, 107 n.77 (2012) (“Some 
consider North Carolina to have the model right-to-farm statute.”). 
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 106-701(b).  
42. § 106-701(a).  
43. § 106-701(a)(3).  











that changes in size and type of operation, and new technology use do not 
constitute fundamental changes.44 The statute also nullifies and voids “[a]ny 
and all ordinances of any unit of local government” that would make the 
agricultural operation a nuisance.45 
As states have adopted RTF laws, some states have adhered closely to 
North Carolina’s model46 while others vary in protectiveness and how an 
operation qualifies for immunity from nuisance liability. For example, 
Mississippi offers an extremely protective statute: an agricultural operation 
which proves it has been in existence for one year or more receives an 
“absolute defense” from nuisance actions.47 The statute does not even 
provide a potential plaintiff the option to plead that a fundamental change 
has occurred as one can in North Carolina. In contrast, Connecticut’s statute 
immunizes agricultural operations from nuisance actions in only five 
instances.48 While these instances are broad and likely encompass the most 
common complaints against agricultural operations, limiting immunity to 
only defined instances is still more restrictive than the immunity North 
Carolina or Mississippi’s statutes provide.49  
The statutes also diverge in determining how an agricultural operation 
qualifies for immunity from nuisance liability. There are two common ways 
an agricultural operation becomes immune from nuisance liability. First, an 
agricultural operation receives immunity by operating prior—typically for 
one50 or two51 years—to the plaintiff’s activity. The second common way 
an agricultural operation receives immunity is by operating in accordance 
with proper agricultural practices.52 Some states demand operations meet 
both requirements to receive immunity.53  
 
44. § 106-701(a1)(1)–(5).  
45. § 106-701(d).  
46. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101 to -08 (West 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (West 
2019). Arkansas’s and Kentucky’s statutes use similar language in their purpose sections and in 
determining how agricultural operations qualify for immunity from nuisance liability.  
47. MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (West 2019). Ohio uses the language of “complete defense” 
from nuisance actions if agricultural operations qualify under a set of factors. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 929.04 (West 2019).  
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-341 (West 2019). 
49. Id.  
50. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 106-701(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107. 
51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19(2)(a) (West 2019) (Minnesota goes on to premise 
immunity on additional factors, too).  
52. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 286.473(1) (West 2020). 
53. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3202(a) (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.140(2)(a) 
(West 2019). For another approach to classifying RTF laws, see Hand, supra note 31, at 306–10 
(classifying RTF laws into three categories: those focusing on priority of ownership, those focusing on 
priority of use, and those that do not require priority to receive immunity, with each category offering 












RTF statutes also often contain purpose sections which declare why the 
state has enacted the statute. These sections are important both for 
determining a statute’s proper scope and for evaluating resulting case law. 
North Carolina’s “model”54 statute’s purpose section recognizes that 
“[w]hen other land uses extend into agricultural and forest areas, 
agricultural and forestry operations often become the subject of nuisance 
suits.”55 The legislature designed the statute to conserve such areas and 
encourage investments in improvements to agricultural operations.56 While 
North Carolina and other states use the vague language of “other land 
uses,”57 numerous states specify urbanization. Washington’s statute, for 
example, reads, in part: “The legislature finds that agricultural activities 
conducted on farmland and forest practices in urbanizing areas are often 
subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and even force 
the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses and timber 
production.”58 
Even though RTF laws have become ubiquitous,59 they are not free of 
controversy. First, these statutes have generated a significant amount of 
controversy—and academic commentary—over their constitutionality.60 
However, almost all courts have upheld the constitutionality of RTF laws 
and it is unlikely that this consensus will shift.61  
Other criticisms have circulated as well. Professor Jacqueline Hand’s 
seminal article on RTF laws outlines some of the early designs of RTF laws 
and issues with their scopes of immunization.62 Reinert argues that RTFs 
suffer from lack of empirical justification and three main theoretical flaws.63 
These theoretical critiques are particularly foundational for this Note. First, 
 
54. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1707. 
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 106-700. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. Many states refer to the rival uses as “nonagricultural.” See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101 
(West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (West 2019). 
58. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 2020); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(2) 
(West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (West 2019).  
59. Hand, supra note 31, at 294–97. 
60. RTF statutes’ constitutionality has come under scrutiny because they create “an implicit 
negative easement in favor of a preexisting agricultural use.” MANDELKER, supra note 36, at 78. Courts 
have considered whether this easement “constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without 
payment of just compensation.” Id.; see generally Terence J. Centner, Governments and 
Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
87 (2006); Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Bormann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test to Determine 
the Constitutionality of Right-to-Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381. 
61. See, e.g., Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 642–46 (Idaho 2004); Barrera v. 
Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App. 2004); Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251, 
1257–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme Court found Iowa’s RTF law to be 
an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 170 
(Iowa 2004), aff’g Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors ex rel. Kossuth Cty., 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).  
62. See generally Hand, supra note 31. 
63. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1714–17, 1728–35. 











RTF laws do not allow for considerations of property-for-personhood 
interests because they do not recognize that some farmers may attach great 
personal value to their land while others do not.64 RTF laws instead provide 
blanket rules that fail to distinguish between different levels of owners’ 
attachment to the land.65 Second, they lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources because they shield farmers “from bearing the costs of their 
activities.”66 Because of the absence of nuisance liability, a farmer may 
engage in activities harmful to neighbors without ever having to fear paying 
damages.67 For example, a hog confinement may emit odor that could 
disturb neighbors’ enjoyment of their land. The threat of nuisance liability 
would incentivize the farmer to expend resources to reduce the odor, and 
thus internalize costs otherwise imposed on others. If he chooses not to do 
so, he may pay damages to neighbors and thus experience cost then. But 
with RTF laws removing the threat of litigation—and thus damages—the 
farmer has less incentive to rein in his activities and instead may continue 
to foist costs onto neighbors.68 RTF legislation thus may shield farms 
operating inefficiently, “lead[ing] to inefficient land use, and ultimately 
environmental degradation.”69 Third, Reinert argues that RTF laws may be 
overprotective because they may deter legitimate suits or hinder beneficial 
legislation—municipal zoning, for example.70  
Professor Neil Hamilton identifies ten flaws affecting RTF laws in his 
overarching critique of the laws’ effectiveness.71 Among his critiques, he 
argues that RTF laws are often not part of a comprehensive plan to conserve 
farmland and instead should exist in concert with other land use programs 
designed to limit the ability of non-farm users to intrude into agricultural 
areas.72 The laws also favor large operations because such operations are 
more likely to cause nuisances.73 Large operations blur a line that Hamilton 
draws between agricultural and industrial operations, and Hamilton argues 
that the latter do not always deserve such sweeping protection.74 Lastly, 
while RTF laws may shield agricultural operations from nuisance liability, 
 
64. Id. at 1729–33; see discussion infra Section IV.B.1.b. 
65. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1732–33. 
66. Id. at 1735; see discussion infra Section IV.B.2. 
67. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1733–35. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1735. 
70. Id. 
71. Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts 
to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 107–08 (1998).  
72. Id. at 117–18.  
73. Id. at 112–13. 












they may spur communities and legislatures to seek other ways to restrict 
such operations, like additional environmental regulation.75  
II. RTF LAWS IN PRACTICE: IMPROPER EXPANSION 
Despite the origins of RTF adoption, numerous states provide immunity 
outside the context of urbanization. The following two cases illustrate 
certain expansions and the resulting ramifications of expanding RTF laws 
beyond their roots.  
The first case, Souza v. Lauppe, concerns two agricultural operations 
near Sacramento, California.76 Both operations had been rice farms for 
several years until the plaintiffs switched from rice to row crops in 1988, 
while the defendants continued growing rice.77 The plaintiffs noticed that 
when the defendants continued flooding their rice fields, water seeped onto 
some of their land, making cultivating row crops difficult there and reducing 
their yields.78 The plaintiffs sued the defendants who characterized the 
lawsuit as a nuisance suit and argued that California’s RTF law immunized 
their operation from nuisance liability.79 The plaintiffs argued that the RTF 
law should only be available for agricultural operations seeking protection 
from urbanization and that the legislature’s concern for protecting 
agricultural uses from the forces of urbanization was the “sole impetus” for 
enacting the RTF law.80 
The California Court of Appeal for the Third District rejected the 
plaintiffs’ arguments.81 The court found the RTF law’s text unambiguous 
and thus determined there was no reason to examine evidence of the 
legislature’s intent extrinsic to the statute’s text.82 The court proceeded to 
note that the statute’s broad language signaled the legislature’s intent to 
protect agricultural operations outside the scope of urbanization.83 The court 
also specifically noted the facts of this case, which are indeed unusual, as 
important to its decision.84 The plaintiffs changed their agricultural 
operation and then demanded that their neighbors adjust their farming 
practices, likely to the detriment of their neighbors’ operation.85 Relying on 
 
75. Id. at 109, 116.  
76. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 1997). 
77. Id. at 496. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 496–97; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5 (West 2019). The statute has not been amended 
since 1992 so its current form is the same as it was in 1997. 
80. Souza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494, 498. 
81. Id. at 499–500. 
82. Id. at 498–99. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 496, 499. 











unusual facts and broad statutory language, the court construed the RTF so 
to immunize agricultural operations from nuisance liability outside the 
context of urbanization. 
The second case concerns a kind of RTF law that expands immunization 
by protecting agricultural operations that comply with “generally accepted 
agricultural and management practices” (GAAMPs).86 Michigan’s statute is 
exemplary, reading: “A farm or farm operation shall not be found to be a 
public or private nuisance if the farm or farm operation alleged to be a 
nuisance conforms to generally accepted agricultural and management 
practices according to policy determined by the Michigan commission of 
agriculture . . . .”87 In Michigan, even as farms adopt new technology or 
change the type of farm product they produce, they continue to receive 
immunity as long as they comply with GAAMPs.88  
Charter Township of Shelby v. Papesh exemplifies the consequences of 
this expansion of immunity.89 The Papeshes bought property in Shelby 
Township on which there were already two chicken coops, and began 
raising chickens.90 Developers built homes on surrounding land, and the 
new neighbors began complaining about the chickens.91 After 
encouragement from these neighbors, Shelby Township sued the Papeshes, 
alleging that their operation constituted a nuisance and that the Papeshes 
were not operating in compliance with GAAMPs.92 The Papeshes argued 
that Michigan’s Right to Farm Act (RTFA) protected their operations.93 The 
court’s analysis of the case focused on whether the Papeshes complied with 
GAAMPs and whether their farm was a commercial operation: “[I]f [the 
Papeshes’] farm is commercial in nature and in compliance with the 
GAAMPs, it is a farm operation protected by the RTFA.”94 Under this test, 
the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court because it could not 
conclude whether the Papeshes’ operation was commercial or whether it 
was fully in compliance with GAAMPs.95 While the court did not resolve 
the particular controversy, its analysis is sufficient to demonstrate how the 
 
86. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4 (West 2019); see also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 286.473(1) (West 2020). 
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473(1). Section 286.472(2)(a) defines farms in part as 
entities engaged in commercial production. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(2)(a). 
88. § 286.473(3); see also Hand, supra note 31, at 311 (noting the problem with eliminating the 
priority requirement in the early years of Michigan’s RTF law); Steven J. Laurent, Comment, Michigan’s 
Right to Farm Act: Have Revisions Gone Too Far?, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 213 
(sharing concern that Michigan’s statute has problematically expanded). 
89. 704 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
90. Id. at 96. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. at 96–97. 
93. Id. at 97. 













premising of immunity under RTF laws like Michigan’s has drifted from 
the laws’ theoretical foundation. The court’s analysis did not consider 
whether there was an issue of coming-to-the-nuisance or questions of 
urbanization because the statute does not require this type of 
consideration.96 These cases thus illustrate how some RTF laws have 
departed from the foundation on which they were built. 
III. CABINED LAWS, SENSIBLE RESULTS 
If and when states choose to reform their RTF laws, they should study 
Washington’s as a model, and other state courts should study Washington 
courts’ jurisprudence on RTF laws, too. The statute’s purpose statement 
makes clear that it aims to relieve agricultural and forestry operations in 
urbanizing areas from nuisance lawsuits.97 It goes on to provide immunity 
from nuisance liability to agricultural operations that use good practices, 
were established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities, and do not 
have a substantial adverse effect on public health and safety.98 The 
following discussion of two Washington cases illustrates how a well-
designed RTF law produces sensible outcomes in the courts. 
Washington courts have narrowly construed Washington’s RTF law. In 
Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Partnership, the Buchanans had farmed 
on their land for decades.99 Simplot purchased a neighboring cattle ranch 
and expanded its operation while another defendant, IBP, Inc. (IBP), had 
purchased and expanded the operation of a meat processing plant.100 These 
operations generated increasing amounts of odor, dust, and flies, spurring 
the Buchanans to sue Simplot and IBP as nuisances.101 Simplot and IBP 
argued that Washington’s RTF law immunized them from nuisance 
liability.102 The Buchanans argued that Washington enacted the RTF law 
only to protect agricultural operations from urbanization and that it should 
not protect an agricultural operation from suit by another agricultural 
operation.103 
After finding the statute ambiguous, the court conducted an extensive 
analysis of both the text and legislative history of the RTF law.104 
 
96. See id.; see also Papadelis v. City of Troy, No. 268920, 2006 WL 2683385, at *3 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Sept. 19, 2006) (affirming the reasoning of Papesh), rev’d on other grounds, 733 N.W.2d 397 
(Mich. 2007). 
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 2020). 
98. Id. § 7.48.305. 
99. 952 P.2d 610, 611 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
100. Id. at 611–12. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 612. 
103. Id. at 613. 
104. Id.   











Washington’s RTF law includes a statement of purpose that emphasizes 
protecting farms from urbanization: “The legislature finds that agricultural 
activities conducted on farmland and forest practices in urbanizing areas are 
often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and even 
force the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses and timber 
production.”105 This purpose colors the entirety of the RTF law and 
encourages a narrow construction by framing the law as a response to 
urbanization.106 The legislative history of the statute also encourages a 
narrow construction.107 Legislators explicitly noted their desire to protect 
farms from urbanization and described protecting rural landowners in 
coming-to-the-nuisance situations.108  
Relying on the legislative history, the court ultimately held that:  
[T]he nuisance protection afforded by the Right–to–Farm Act must 
be applied cautiously and narrowly. RCW 7.48.305 should not be 
read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance actions 
brought by an agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the 
plaintiff occupied the land before the nuisance activity was 
established.109 
In coming to this conclusion, the Washington Supreme Court properly 
narrowed the state’s RTF law to apply in urbanizing scenarios and 
recognized the importance of priority in time in determining nuisance 
liability. 
Washington courts have since affirmed this reasoning. For example, in 
Davis v. Taylor, an apple orchard near a long-established residential 
subdivision was purchased and converted to a cherry orchard.110 The 
orchard operators began using propane cannons and cherry guns to protect 
their crops from birds.111 The neighbors sued, alleging that the agricultural 
operation constituted a nuisance due to the new increase in noise.112 In 
interpreting the state and Yakima County RTF laws,113 the court followed 
Buchanan and found that Washington’s RTF law was meant to protect 
against urban encroachment and thus did not immunize the defendants from 
nuisance liability: “The act effectively codified the ‘coming to the nuisance 
 
105. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 2020). 
106. Buchanan, 952 P.2d at 614. 
107. Id. at 614–15. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 615–16. 
110. 132 P.3d 783, 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 













defense’ (where a party moves to an existing nuisance).”114 Washington’s 
RTF law and its resulting case law thus provide a model for other states 
interested in returning their RTF laws to their theoretical foundations.  
IV. HOW AND WHY TO CORRECT THE COURSE OF RTF LAWS 
A. Reforming RTF Laws 
This Note urges states to revise their laws with Washington’s, not North 
Carolina’s, statute as their model. It also urges courts to follow the model 
provided by Washington courts to help return RTF laws to a narrower and 
better purpose. States should reform their laws in a few specific ways. First, 
states should include purpose statements, such as Washington’s, clarifying 
that the RTF law aims to provide protection in the face of urbanization.115 
Second, the law should then go on to premise immunity on whether the 
agricultural operation has priority in time compared to the competing use.116 
GAAMPs can still have a useful role in RTF statutes but following them 
should not alone shield agricultural operations from nuisance suits. Instead, 
asking for agricultural operations to follow GAAMPs in addition to 
enjoying priority in time to qualify for immunity from suit 
rewardsagricultural operations for implementing best practices.117 Third, 
states should modify RTF statutes so agricultural operations which 
significantly change their operations lose their immunity.118 This provision 
is not a requirement that an operation remain static, never expanding or 
changing ventures. Instead, this requirement acknowledges that the scope 
 
114. Id. at 785 (citing Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc’y, 111 P.3d 257, 260–
61 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); Buchanan, 952 P.2d at 615). 
115. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 2020); see also Hand, supra note 31, at 
305–06 (encouraging the use of purpose statements); Grossman & Fischer, supra note 30, at 122–25 
(also arguing for limiting RTF laws’ application to the context of urban sprawl where plaintiffs come to 
the nuisance).  
116. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.305(1). This Note’s conception of priority matches 
what Hand categorizes as priority in ownership because it aims to be “consistent” with the coming-to-
the-nuisance doctrine and recognizes the “visceral sense that it is unfair to allow an individual buying 
property with full notice of a neighbor’s activities . . . to stop the neighbor’s operation.” Hand, supra 
note 31, at 306–07 (footnote omitted). Hand makes two critiques of RTF laws adopting this conception 
of priority: (1) such statutes may make it harder for individuals to sell their land because the new 
purchaser will not have the option to sue a neighboring agricultural operation for nuisance; and (2) such 
statutes limit their own applicability. Id. at 307–08. Regarding the former, this Note believes that this 
consequence is a permissible concession because this proposal aims to prevent arriving land uses from 
suing existing land uses because the arriving use could have chosen to locate elsewhere. And regarding 
the latter, this Note argues that limiting RTF laws’ applicability is in fact desirable.  
117. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.305(1). 
118. Washington’s law does not state this provision explicitly although it has been interpreted to 
function in this manner. See Davis, 132 P.3d 783. Idaho’s RTF law is an example where the law’s 
protections do not apply in cases of improper or negligent expansions of operations. See IDAHO CODE 
ANN. §§ 22-4503, 22-4505 (West 2019). 











of some changes may drastically alter an operation’s nature and the 
externalities it produces. Long-established neighbors may find their 
operations drastically affected yet would have no recourse in a nuisance suit 
under some expanded RTF laws. This proposal draws no hard lines as to 
what constitutes a significant change, although several courts have already 
considered the issue.119 It will necessarily be a fact-based inquiry whose 
central mission should be determining whether the newly-changed 
operation remains compatible with the surrounding uses which existed prior 
to the change. 
Additionally, in interpreting future cases concerning RTF laws, this 
proposal encourages judges to consider the legislative intent and history 
behind these laws in accordance with a purposivist philosophy.120 The 
Washington Supreme Court analyzed the state’s RTF law in part by 
considering the history of RTF laws and how the law’s purpose section 
colored the entire statute in adopting its narrowing construction.121 
Considering the policy context behind RTF laws contributes to courts 
producing sensible resolutions and helps courts better respect a legislature’s 
will, avoid inserting their own beliefs into the text, and have a base for 
resolving ambiguities in the statutes.122 Looking to legislative history also 
avoids the personal bias inherent in a purely textual inquiry.123 This Note 
acknowledges that the use of legislative intent or history in statutory 
interpretation is controversial but it is not without precedent.124 The United 
 
119. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2. 
120. This Note here echoes and aims to supplement one of Reinert’s proposals. See Reinert, supra 
note 38, at 1735. For introductions to purposivism, see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from 
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 85–91 (2006) (discussing tools used by modern purposivists in 
their inquiries, and similarities in analysis to textualists); Michael C. Mikulic, Case Comment, The 
Emergence of Contextually Constrained Purposivism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 128, 140–42 
(2016) (discussing modern pattern of reading statutes in light of their purposes); see also Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives 
on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1538 (2003) (illustrating 
how understanding a statute’s history enriches statutory interpretation).  
121. Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’ship, 952 P.2d 610, 614 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (“Our 
ability to interpret and apply the Right–to–Farm Act is enhanced by the Legislature’s express statement 
of findings and purpose.”); see also Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Idaho 1995) (noting the law’s 
statement of legislative intent).  
122. Mikulic, supra note 120, at 140–42; see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85–88 (2005) (comparing purposivism and 
textualism); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 94–98 (2010); 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 457–
58 (1988). 
123. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the 
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 142 (2012). 
124. Some of America’s leading jurists have rejected considering legislative intent or history. See, 
e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29–37 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988). See Farber & Frickey, supra note 122, at 453, for a direct 












States Supreme Court recently examined the policy context of statutes in 
several major cases and found policy and history more persuasive than 
purely textual arguments.125 This Note does not argue that the legislative 
intent or history should dictate a statute’s interpretation, but rather argues 
that the aforementioned benefits of considering the policy context of RTF 
laws in judicial analyses help produce sensible outcomes in RTF cases. 
B. Justifying Reform  
Two primary justifications exist for revising RTF statutes in this way. 
First, this revision’s emphasis on priority-in-time returns RTF laws to their 
foundation in the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine. As Spur illustrated, 
urbanization can upset long-established rural land uses. In the face of 
urbanization, this doctrine protects parties’ expectations and honors parties’ 
property-for-personhood interests. Second, this revision reduces the 
economic inefficiency generated by RTF laws. The broader the 
immunization from liability is, the greater the inefficiency generated will 
be. Revised statutes restricting immunity to instances of urbanization where 
the agricultural operator has priority-in-time reduce the total instances of 
immunity and thus reduce economic inefficiency. Similarly, if operations 
that change significantly lose their immunity, the pool of immune operators 
continues to shrink and exposes more operations to liability, continuing to 
reduce inefficiency. 
1. The Value of the Coming-to-the-Nuisance Doctrine 
Expanding RTF laws to provide immunity for agricultural operations 
against nuisance suits from long-established rural neighbors or any neighbor 
on the ground of following GAAMPs alone is improper. First, it unmoors 
RTF laws from their original theoretical underpinnings as attempts to codify 
the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine.126 This doctrine should not be 
abandoned. Courts have long considered whether a party having priority in 
 
125. See Note, The Rise of Purposivism and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the 
Supreme Court, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1229–37 (2017) (analyzing recent cases and finding the Court 
taking a purposivist approach); see also Mikulic, supra note 120, at 130. 
126. MANDELKER, supra note 36, at 78. 











time matters in nuisance suits.127 Many courts have determined that it does, 
including in the context of agricultural operations.128 
a. Protecting Expectations 
The coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine helps protect parties’ “legitimate 
expectations.”129 “[A] broadly shared feeling that claims of right arise from 
temporal priority” exists.130 One scholar, R.E. Hawkins, in a thought 
experiment based off the landmark Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. case,131 
considers why an established operation, by virtue of temporal priority, 
should prevail in a conflict between it and a new use.132 A property owner 
may establish an interest in his property, an interest around which behavior 
and values may develop.133 When an established interest clashes with an 
arriving one, a court should consider these developed behavior and values 
in adjudicating property rights.134 To do otherwise unethically ignores a 
distinction between an established and a new interest: that the nature of 
being established—of having a degree of permanence and the behaviors that 
come with it—deserves recognition in and of itself.135 Also, an established 
operation has “legitimate expectations of permanence.”136 Hawkins 
identifies these expectations as being at the heart of the “ethical 
underpinnings of the concept of property.”137 Thus, disregarding temporal 
priority risks disregarding one aspect of what makes property property.138  
 
127. See, e.g., McCarty v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 81 N.E. 549, 550 (N.Y. 1907) (“Location, 
priority of occupation, and the fact that the injury is only occasional, are not conclusive, but are to be 
considered in connection with all the evidence . . . .”); McIntosh v. Brimmer, 230 P. 203, 204 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1924) (citing McCarty). But see Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876) (“It matters not 
that the brick-yard was used before plaintiffs bought their lands or built their houses.”); Richards v. Ohio 
River R.R. Co., 49 S.E. 385, 386 (W. Va. 1904) (“If one comes to a nuisance, that does not debar him 
in legal proceedings for harm from it or to restrain it.”). 
128. See, e.g., Davis v. Taylor, 132 P.3d 783, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (paying particular 
attention to the fact that the change in the orchard’s activity occurred after the plaintiff neighbors had 
arrived). For a much earlier case in the agricultural context, see Hall v. Budde, 169 S.W.2d 33, 33 (Ky. 
1943) (“[T]he fact that the complainants ‘moved to the nuisance’ is but a factor, though an important 
one, to be considered . . . .”). 
129. Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 
ALB. L. REV. 189, 284 (1990). 
130. Id. at 284–85 (citing, among others, R.E. Hawkins, ‘In and of Itself’: Some Thoughts on the 
Assignment of Property Rights in Nuisance Cases, 36 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (1978)). 
131. 340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972). 
132. Hawkins, supra note 130, at 217. 
133. Id. at 215. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 215–16. 














An agricultural operation that begins operating in a rural area almost 
certainly has established patterns of behavior and legitimate expectations of 
permanence. Agricultural operators invest significant amounts of capital at 
their operations’ outset. Public accountant Shawn Williamson calculated 
how much it would cost to assemble various farming operations—such as 
wheat, grain, and dairy operations—from scratch.139 He found that these 
operations require millions of dollars in start-up funds.140 And none of these 
potential operations were industrial in scale, meaning that larger farms 
almost certainly demand even more capital. Faced with such high entry 
costs, operators only start farming if they believe they will be able to 
continue their operations in the future.141 If another operator comes onto the 
scene and, as part of its operations, demands that the first operator change 
or cease its operation to accommodate the new operation, it upsets the first 
operator’s legitimate expectations.142 Privileging the first operation 
maintains those expectations and recognizes that the second user is “usually 
the ‘least-cost-avoider’ of the conflict”:143 The first operator already 
incurred costs of selecting its location and starting operations.144 The second 
would-be operator has yet to incur these costs, has the opportunity to 
research the first operator’s operation and determine whether they are 
“incompatible uses,” and has the opportunity to find another location.145 
Reformed RTF laws recognize that honoring the coming-to-the-nuisance 
doctrine helps protect operators’ legitimate economic expectations. 
b. Property as Personhood 
The party with priority in time also likely values its operation more not 
just due to its expectations but due to emotional ties, too. Professor Margaret 
 
139. See Shawn Williamson, How Much $ Does It Take to Become a Farmer?, SUCCESSFUL 
FARMING (June 27, 2017), https://www.agriculture.com/farm-management/business-planning/how-muc 
h-does-it-take-to-become-a-farmer [https://perma.cc/D5Q2-7K9G] [hereinafter Williamson, How Much 
$ Does It Take to Become a Farmer?]; Shawn Williamson, What’s the Cost of Grain Farming in Iowa 
vs. Nebraska Dairy or Kansas Wheat?, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.agriculture 
.com/farm-management/business-planning/whats-the-cost-of-grain-farming-in-ia-vs-neb-dairy-and-ks-
wheat?did=165347&utm_campaign=todaysnews_081817&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ag-new 
sletter [https://perma.cc/AER3-VH3X].  
140. Williamson, How Much $ Does It Take to Become a Farmer?, supra note 139. 
141. Hand, supra note 31, at 292–93. Hand describes the “impermanence syndrome” a farmer 
may experience if he or she perceives that his operation could be declared a nuisance: “This syndrome 
is characterized by a disinclination on the part of a farmer to invest in farm buildings or equipment 
because of a belief that he or she is unlikely to be farming on that property over the long term.” Id. 
142. Lewin, supra note 129, at 285. 
143. Id. The first operation can not only capitalize on its initial investment, but this privileging 
also “give[s it] an incentive to develop [its] land without having to worry about future nuisance 
conflicts.” Id. at 286. 
144. Id. at 285. 
145. Id. 











Jane Radin has argued extensively that not all personal properties are 
fungible commodities.146 Instead, we identify with certain objects that are 
so important to us that they make up part of our personhood.147 These items 
have “an appropriate connection to our conception of human flourishing.”148 
Radin identifies an object like “a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a 
house” as being objects “closely bound up with personhood.”149 This type 
of connection is often present between farmers and their land.150 Place 
attachment research demonstrates that places have special meaning for 
individuals.151 Farmers both give and receive a sense of security from their 
land: “The farm provides a sense of peace and sometimes even helps 
farmers through difficult personal journeys.”152 Radin proposes that a 
connection like this should receive special protection in adjudicating claims: 
Where we can ascertain that a given property right is personal, there 
is a prima facie case that that right should be protected to some extent 
against invasion by government and against cancellation by 
conflicting fungible property claims of other people. This case is 
strongest where without the claimed protection of property as 
personal, the claimants’ opportunities to become fully developed 
persons in the context of our society would be destroyed or 
significantly lessened, and probably also where the personal property 
rights are claimed by individuals who are maintaining and expressing 
their group identity.153 
 
146. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907 (1987). 
Reinert also discusses RTF laws in the context of Radin’s scholarship and argues that because RTF laws 
are insensitive to context, they preclude courts from adequately weighing property-for-personhood 
interests. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1732–33. This Note aims to supplement and respond to his critique 
by connecting Radin’s scholarship with recent scholarship on place attachment theory and by arguing 
that reforming RTF laws in the proposed way will help ensure that only agricultural operators with 
property-for-personhood interests in their land, at least as compared to a rival, litigious land use, receive 
protection under RTF laws.  
147. Radin, supra note 146, at 1907–09. Radin argues that there are “three main, overlapping 
aspects of personhood: freedom, identity, and contextuality.” Id. at 1904 (discussing these aspects).  
148. Id. at 1908 (discussing what makes a connection appropriate). 
149. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982). 
150. See generally Claudia Baldwin et al., Love of the Land: Social-Ecological Connectivity of 
Rural Landholders, 51 J. RURAL STUD. 37 (2017); Courtney E. Quinn & Angela C. Halfacre, Place 
Matters: An Investigation of Farmers’ Attachment to Their Land, 20 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 117 (2014); 
Carol Hunter, Opinion, Sale of Family Farm Spawns Tug of Emotions, DES MOINES REG. (Dec. 21, 
2014, 12:42 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2014/12/21 
/sale-family-farm-spurs-emotions/20722877/ [https://perma.cc/K2SF-CJPH] (personal account of a 
farm family’s ties to its land). 
151. See generally Maria Lewicka, Place Attachment: How Far Have We Come in the Last 40 
Years?, 31 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 207 (2011). 
152. Quinn & Halfacre, supra note 150, at 127. 












A reformed, cabined RTF law better provides this special protection only 
to deserving operators. By returning RTF laws to their roots in the coming-
to-the-nuisance doctrine, this Note’s proposal ensures that operators 
benefiting from RTF laws’ protections are operators who have been in the 
area longer than the arriving, urbanizing land use from which they receive 
protection. So by design, only operators with comparatively strong 
property-for-personhood interests benefit from the reformed RTF law. The 
arriving rival land uses have simply not had the time to develop property-
for-personhood relationships with their land. In his critique, Reinert had 
suggested that smaller farms deserve more protection in part as a proxy for 
privileging farmers with strong property-for-personhood interests.154 This 
Note believes that time spent with the land rather than size is a better proxy 
for privileging these interests because the passage of time is critical in 
allowing a farmer to bond with his or her land, no matter how many acres it 
may be. In short, farmers bond with their land through work and play, and 
this consideration of place attachment weighs in favor of prioritizing the 
coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine in RTF laws to better privilege these 
bonds.155  
2. Promoting Economic Efficiency 
In addition to restoring temporal priority as the key criterion in RTF 
statutes, this proposal aims to reduce the amount of economic inefficiency 
generated by these statutes.156 Narrowing RTF laws in the proposed way 
reduces inefficiency by reducing eligibility for immunity, thus exposing 
more operations to liability. Removing immunity incentivizes an operation 
to reduce the negative externalities it produces because it now faces the 
prospect of liability and damages. In doing so, an operation internalizes the 
costs of its activity that it had previously foisted on others. Returning RTF 
laws to their roots thus leads to laws that strike healthier balances between 
economic efficiency and other public policy justifications for these laws.157  
 
154. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1737. Reinert does note that “size may not be the best proxy for 
whether a farmer has developed a valued relationship with the land that cannot be compensated.” Id. 
This Note here offers another proxy for consideration.  
155. Quinn & Halfacre, supra note 150, at 128. It is important to note that this Note does not argue 
that any land use with priority in time should automatically be insulated from nuisance liability in all 
contexts. We must be mindful that “if coming to the nuisance were an automatic bar [to pursuing a 
nuisance claim], a defendant who carried on certain activities ‘could condemn all the land in his vicinity 
to a servitude without paying any compensation.’” Grossman & Fischer, supra note 30, at 108 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). This discussion’s preference 
for prioritizing the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine is limited to this proposal for reforming RTF 
statutes.  
156. See discussion supra Section II. 
157. See generally JOHN P. BLAIR, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 
32–33 (1995) (discussing why evaluating externalities cannot provide all the answers). 











a. Externalities in Agriculture 
“An externality is . . . the effect of one person’s decision on someone 
who is not a party to that decision.”158 Externalities play an important role 
in American law and politics: “[M]any scholars have made the point that 
externalities set the stage for discussions of government regulation or other 
sorts of intervention. . . . Externalities likewise permeate the work of the 
judiciary . . . .”159  
It is no secret that agricultural operations and policies generate negative 
externalities. Professor Terence J. Centner, for example, has examined 
environmental problems posed by concentrated animal feeding operations 
and how to counteract these problems with different land practices.160 By 
immunizing qualifying agricultural operations from nuisance liability, RTF 
laws reduce one way in which society attempts to prevent an “oversupply 
of some dangerous activities.”161 In addition, Reinert argues that RTF laws 
generate economic inefficiency by “discourag[ing] mutually beneficial 
gains from trades between farmers and other landowners.”162 Farms may not 
always be the most economically efficient use of the land, yet most RTF 
laws, as currently written, shield them from “bearing the costs of their 
activities.”163 
Freed from nuisance suits incentivizing cost-internalization, operators 
may be able to expand or change the nature of their operations in ways that 
impose far more costs on neighboring land, far more than their neighbors 
ever could have anticipated.164 Michigan’s RTF statute is particularly 
lenient. As previously referenced, Michigan’s RTF law allows farms to be 
exempt from nuisance liability if they conform with GAAMPs.165 Another 
subsection of the Michigan RTF law specifically provides that an operation 
 
158. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988). 
159. Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
321, 341, 344 (2016) (citing David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender 
Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 722 (1987); Fred S. McChesney, Current Excuses for Regulating Futures 
Transactions: Avoiding the E-Word, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 902, 903 (1989)). 
160. Terence J. Centner, Concentrated Feeding Operations: An Examination of Current 
Regulations and Suggestions for Limiting Negative Externalities, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219 (2000); 
see also Terence J. Centner, Nuisances from Animal Feeding Operations: Reconciling Agricultural 
Production and Neighboring Property Rights, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 5, 11 (2006) (discussing 
objectionable practices by agricultural operations).  
161. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 22 (2009). “The law 
internalizes negative externalities by providing general tort liability rules.” Id. at 21; see also Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–16 (1972) (discussing different liability rules for how nuisance 
suits can attempt to control pollution). 
162. Reinert, supra note 38, at 1734. 
163. Id. at 1735; see discussion supra Section I.C. 
164. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 161, at 22. 












conforming with GAAMPs cannot become a nuisance even if it changes in 
size, adopts new technology, or changes the type of farm product being 
produced.166 It is conceivable that any one of these changes could lead to 
neighboring land uses experiencing drastically different conditions than 
they had experienced before the change.  
Changing an operation’s scale may bring many new problems. More 
livestock, for example, produce more waste and thus more odor. A new 
technology may operate perfectly but still generate more noise than previous 
technology did. Changing farm products may come in the form of changing 
from producing grain to raising livestock, or changing the type of livestock 
raised. Livestock is noisier and more odiferous than grain, and one type of 
livestock may generate more noise or waste per capita than the previously 
raised livestock. 
Laux v. Chopin Land Associates, Inc. sheds some light on how courts 
may treat these types of changes.167 The Lauxes, previously grain farmers, 
started raising hogs on their farm, beginning with only a few dozen but soon 
growing to a few hundred hogs.168 A developer owning neighboring land 
sued, alleging that the hogs constituted a nuisance due to odor.169 The 
Lauxes argued that Indiana’s RTF law protected their operation.170 Under 
Indiana’s statute, an agricultural operation that significantly changes loses 
its protection.171 The court found that changing from a grain growing 
operation to a hog raising operation did constitute a significant change.172 
But the court found that the increase in the number of hogs and the 
accompanying construction of buildings to house them did not constitute a 
significant change.173 The apparent conclusion that going from a few dozen 
hogs to a few hundred does not constitute a significant change in operation 
shows how much leeway some courts allow RTF statutes to give farmers to 
alter their operations, and thus potentially the conditions of their 
neighborhood, all while keeping their immunity.174 Between GAAMP-
premised immunity and lenient courts, RTF expansions clearly risk 
 
166. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473(3). 
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174. Not every court presented with a Laux-like situation has held similarly. See Crea v. Crea, 16 
P.3d 922, 925 (Idaho 2000) (finding an expanding hog operation ineligible for RTF protection). 











generating increased economic inefficiency. Revised statutes rein in this 
inefficiency by immunizing only agricultural operations that have priority 
in time in the face of urbanization. 
b. Tempering the Critique 
However, despite the general indictment of RTF laws for economic 
inefficiency the aforementioned scholars provide, this Note aims to temper 
the force of this paradigm’s critique of RTF laws in recognition of some of 
the paradigm’s limits. Reinert admits that it may be difficult to accurately 
evaluate the externalities created by farming.175 Professor Ronald Coase 
notes that, from an economic standpoint, there is reciprocal responsibility 
for the creation of a nuisance; the agricultural operation is not solely to 
blame.176 He provides an especially apt example of how it is hard to frame 
externalities by posing a conflict between a rancher and a farmer.177 The 
rancher’s cattle damage the farmer’s crops while roaming.178 Coase writes: 
“[I]t is true that there would be no crop damage without the cattle. It is 
equally true that there would be no crop damage without the crops. . . . If 
we are to discuss the problem in terms of causation, both parties cause the 
damage.”179  
It is also hard to frame externalities because a single action may generate 
positive or negative externalities depending on one’s standpoint.180 There is 
a “slipperiness” to nuisance law and “individual cases often turn on who can 
tell the most compelling externality story.”181 Further, externalities are 
subject to exaggeration.182 For example, an “externality entrepreneur” may 
highlight a “dread risk” posed by an activity that evokes an emotional 
reaction among community members that is disproportionate to the burden 
the activity actually imposes.183  
Agricultural operations also have the potential to create positive 
externalities, including providing economic opportunities, enhancing a 
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Id. at 327. The very existence of this type of actor demonstrates that calculating and dealing with 












geographic identity, stabilizing the climate, and preserving biodiversity and 
viable ecosystems.184 And, returning to Coase, evaluating nuisance law 
involves “dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.”185 It is important 
to evaluate the rival use, such as urbanizing real estate development, 
accusing the agricultural operation of being a nuisance.186 “The problem is 
to avoid the more serious harm.”187 Urbanizing development often gives rise 
to negative externalities such as increased traffic congestion and 
pollution.188 Overall, “[t]he externality problem increases rapidly as urban 
density increases.”189 The host of environmental land use regulations arising 
in response to land use policy speaks to the risks that development poses.190 
Additionally, the development coming in contact with agricultural uses may 
represent a particularly troubling kind of development: urban sprawl that 
may engender new or exacerbate existing issues.191 Unfortunately, 
expanding suburbs often collide with highly productive farmland.192 
Multiple scholars have identified urban sprawl as a threat to public health 
and the environment.193 Reforming RTF laws in the manner proposed 
reduces some of the worst economic inefficiency generated by RTF laws 
while recognizing that agricultural uses generate positive externalities, too, 
and that rival uses, such as urbanization, may not present more favorable 
externality balances, either.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Certain legislators, farmers, interest groups, or other entities may all 
resist this proposal for fear that farmers will face more nuisance suits. To 
those who share these concerns, this proposal can be implemented as part 
of a concert of action communities and states take to manage the 
relationship between agriculture and urbanization. RTF laws can and should 
be one part of a slate of land use planning policies.194 For example, as 
previously discussed, RTF laws were introduced in part because of concerns 
over the efficacy of agricultural zoning and districting.195 Using a 
combination of these tools to create flexibility in land management is one 
way in which communities can move forward. For example, if a community 
wants to make sure agricultural operations receive protection from 
urbanization, instead of relying on an overly broad RTF law, that 
community can zone land exclusively for agricultural uses. This type of 
zoning is sometimes disfavored because of how effective it is, and it can thus 
provide broad protection in certain areas if that is desired.196 RTF laws 
should be only one tool in the toolbox for crafting land use policy.  
A second implication of the proposal concerns whether RTF laws may 
be able to provide a legal framework for urban farming in American 
cities.197 Urban farming has become increasingly common in America and 
provides a host of positive externalities.198 However, some city planners 
have balked at the growth of urban farming operations due to both 
environmental and economic concerns.199 One analysis of several RTF laws 
found a shortcoming when it comes to protecting urban agriculture.200 The 
remedy for this situation is outside the scope of this Note. Narrowing the 
protection provided by RTF laws would certainly not help urban farms. Due 
to the relative newness of urban farms, they would likely have difficulty 
establishing priority in time. And because urban farms may operate under 
communal ownership it may be more difficult to argue that a property-as-
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personhood relationship has developed. Again, communities should look to 
all the tools available to them in crafting their land use policies. RTF laws 
may be poor solutions to encouraging or protecting urban farms.201 New 
legislation or policies targeting urban farming will likely be more effective 
than overly broad RTF laws. 
CONCLUSION 
In certain states, RTF laws have become divorced from their foundations. 
This Note proposes reforming these laws by returning them to their roots: 
agricultural operations should only be shielded from nuisance liability when 
sued by new neighbors in the context of urbanization. Some states’ current 
expansive immunities that allow changed operations to shield themselves 
from fellow, established rural neighbors or to rely only on complying with 
GAAMPs unmoor the laws from their theoretical foundation and generate 
too much economic inefficiency. Under one of these more expansive laws, 
if then-Congressman Braley had sued his neighbor, it is possible he would 
have had little recourse, even if the chickens had only just arrived. States 
should not rely on overly broad RTF laws to protect agricultural operations. 
Narrower RTF laws provide more sensible resolutions in conflicts between 
agricultural operations and their neighbors. 
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